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LONGEVITY INSURANCE:
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR
OLDER RETIREES
JOHN A. TURNER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Social Security provides a guaranteed lifetime benefit, but it
is insufficient for most people to maintain their pre-retirement
standard of living. Accordingly, most people need to supplement
their Social Security benefits with other sources of income. While
low-income retirees at age 62 often rely largely on Social Security,
other retirees tend to have additional sources of retirement
income. However, as people grow older, especially as they live past
their life expectancies, they risk exhausting their non-Social
Security sources of income.
Individuals in their 80s and older who have low Social
Security benefits face particular economic vulnerability. At that
age, few of them are able to offset their low benefits by working.
As a matter of national policy, it is desirable for people in this age
group, often called the old-old, to be able to live with sufficient
resources to enjoy the last years of their lives with dignity.
Beyond Social Security, another source of income available to
older retirees is longevity insurance, a deferred annuity that starts
at an advanced age, such as 82. This type of annuity provides a
form of insurance for long-lived persons who may have outlived
their non-Social Security sources of income.
This Article proposes that longevity insurance should be
added as a benefit provided by Social Security. To do so would not
only help to protect older retirees, but it would also be particularly
valuable as part of a reform package that included benefit cuts.
This is because a social safety net would be needed to offset the
effects of Social Security benefit cuts on the most vulnerable
retirees.
When viewed from an international perspective, persons age
65 and older are much more likely to be in poverty in the United

* John A. Turner is the Director of the Pension Policy Center in Washington,
DC. He has published more than 100 articles and a dozen books on retirement
income policy. This Article is derived from a report prepared for the National
Academy of Social Insurance under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.
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States than in any other high-income country.1 When poverty is
measured as having income below 40 percent of national median
income, the poverty rates for persons age 65 and older are 1.7
percent for Canada, 3.9 percent for Germany, 2.1 percent for
Sweden and 10.2 percent for the United Kingdom, compared to
15.0 percent for the United States.2
As such, longevity insurance would be particularly desirable
if a benefit cut disproportionately affected people at older ages. An
example of such a benefit cut would be to change the cost-of-living
adjustment by using the chained Consumer Price Index (CPI),3
which
would
reduce
indexing.
This
change
would
disproportionately affect people at older ages because the effect of
the reduced indexing would be compounded as they grew older.
The target population for this Social Security reform proposal
is people age 82 and older, especially those with low Social
Security benefits and long work histories. Age 82 was chosen
because it is approximately the average life expectancy of a person
at age 65.4 It is important to note that women outnumber men by
roughly two to one in this age group.5 In part because of increases
in life expectancy, this age group is growing rapidly. Additionally,
the aging baby-boomer generation will further swell the numbers
of people in their 80s.
II. AN INCREASING RISK OF POVERTY WITH ADVANCING AGE
Poverty rates for the elderly increase with age. Elderly
poverty is high among people age 80 and older—a third higher
than for people age 65 to 69.6 Poverty is particularly a problem
among older women. The poverty rate for women age 80 and older

1. Timothy Smeeding & Susanna Sandström, Poverty and Income
Maintenance in Old Age: A Cross-National View of Low Income Older Women,
LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY WORKING PAPER NO. 398, 18 (Jan. 2005),
available at http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/398.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Chained Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (last modified Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.t05.htm (explaining that the C-CPI-U is a
close approximation to a cost-of-living index in that it, in its final form,
accounts for any substitution that consumers make across item categories in
response to changes in relative prices).
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, QuickStats: Life
Expectancy at Age 65 by Sex and Race - United States, 1999-2004, MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5607a5.htm.
5. Id.
6. Debra Whitman & Patrick Purcell, Topics in Aging: Income and
Poverty Among Older Americans in 2005, CONG. RES. SERV REPORTS AND
ISSUE BRIEFS, 8 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://digital
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=crs.

Do Not Delete

2013]

10/18/2013 4:31 PM

Longevity Insurance

845

was 14 percent in 2004.7 Twenty-five percent of women in this
group had income below 125 percent of the poverty line, compared
to 10 percent and 13 percent for women age 55 and 61,
respectively, indicating a 40 percent increase in the poverty rate
for older women.8 One reason for this increase is that as people
grow older, they tend to rely on Social Security for an increasing
portion of their retirement income. This is due to a decline in the
availability of other sources of retirement income. Official poverty
statistics, which are based on a methodology established in 1964,
understate the problem of poverty in this age group because they
no longer represent the minimum needs of older persons.9
These figures are an imperfect measure of how poverty rates
increase as people age. Due to the greater mortality risk of lowincome persons, these figures understate the percentage of older
women who have fallen into poverty. For example, a recent study
of males found that, at ages 63 to 71, the higher their lifetime
income, at least up to a fairly high level, the lower their mortality
risk.10
People in this age group are at risk of falling into poverty
even though they had not been in poverty earlier in their lives.11
They also have greater difficulty leaving poverty than people who
are a few years younger.12 And this problem may be growing over
time. While the bankruptcy rate for persons under age 55 fell over
the period of 1991 to 2007, it more than quadrupled for people age
75 to 84.13 Thus, numerous consequences of flawed decisionmaking may lead to financial distress in advanced old age.
The MetLife Retirement Income IQ Study provides evidence
of a number of issues relating to people’s ability to plan for their

7. Lynn Fisher & Anne DeCesaro, Income of the Population 55 or Older,
2004 (Expanded Edition), SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 18 (July 2008),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2004ee/
incpop04ee.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Barbara A. Butrica & Sheila R. Zedlewski, More Older Americans Are
Poor than the Official Measure Suggests, RETIREMENT POLICY PROGRAM, NO.
15, URBAN INSTITUTE (May 2008), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411670_older_americans.pdf.
10. Hilary Waldron, Mortality Differentials by Lifetime Earnings Decile:
Implications for Evaluations of Proposed Social Security Law Changes, SOCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN VOL. 73, NO. 1, 1 (2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
policy/docs/ssb/v73n1/v73n1p1.pdf.
11. Sunhwa Lee & Lois Shaw, From Work to Retirement: Tracking Changes
in Women’s Retirement Status, AARP PUB. POLICY INSTITUTE RESEARCH
REPORT 2008-03, iii (Feb. 2008), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
econ/2008_03_poverty.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Matt Sedensky, Study: Bankruptcies Soar for Senior Citizens, USA
TODAY (Sept. 5, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-0
8-31-bankrupt-seniors_N.htm.
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spending in old age.14 It found that nearly 70 percent of preretirees overestimate how much they can withdraw from their
savings while ensuring that their savings will last.15 More than 40
percent indicated that they think they could withdraw 10 percent
of their savings each year while preserving their principal, while
14 percent believe they could draw down 15 percent per year while
maintaining their principal.16 Almost half estimate that they will
need 50 percent or less of their pre-retirement income to maintain
their consumption in retirement.17 Six in 10 people in this group
underestimate their chances of living beyond average life
expectancy.18
Thus, a number of factors may account for why someone who
was not in poverty at age 62 may fall into poverty later in life. For
many people, these scenarios may be a source of worry, but others
are oblivious to the financial risks in their future.
People at advanced ages who are in poverty can be classified
into four groups: (1) people who were poor when they retired; (2)
people who were well-informed, rational planners and were not
poor at age 62 but experienced bad luck during retirement; (3)
people who were not poor and were rational planners but lived
longer than expected and were not adequately insured against
that possibility; and (4) people who were not poor at age 62, but,
due to human foibles of poor decision-making and misconceptions
identified by behavioral economics, have become poor in old age.
This categorization helps clarify the reasons why people would
benefit from longevity insurance.
Because of these problems, a higher percentage of people at
older ages depend on Social Security for most or all of their income
than do people in their 60s and 70s.19 For those age 75 and older,
40 percent depend on Social Security for 90 percent or more of
their income, compared to 27 percent of people age 65 to 74.20
III. LONGEVITY INSURANCE
Longevity insurance is a special type of annuity. Annuities
are financial instruments that pay a stream of benefits over
time.21 A life annuity pays fixed nominal benefits periodically until

14. MetLife Retirement Income IQ Study: A Survey of Pre-Retiree
Knowledge of Financial Retirement Issues, METLIFE MATURE MARKET
INSTITUTE (June 2008), available at https://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/
publications/studies/mmi-retirement-income-iq.pdf.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Fisher & DeCesaro, supra note 7, at 21.
20. Id.
21. Annuities, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N (last modified Apr. 6, 2011),
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death.22 Annuities can be purchased privately or through pension
plans.23 They can be purchased at retirement as immediate
annuities, or they can be purchased for later receipt as deferred
annuities.24 The large majority of annuities purchased in the
United States for payment in retirement are purchased as
immediate annuities.25 Although the immediate annuities market
dominates the deferred annuities market in most countries with
substantial annuities markets—such as the United Kingdom and
the United States, Denmark, and Germany—have sizeable
deferred annuities markets.26
A. Efficient Insurance
Longevity insurance, also called an “advanced life delayed
annuity,” is a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced age,
such as 82.27 Adding longevity insurance to Social Security would
address the problem of individuals falling into poverty at advanced
older ages by providing cost effective social insurance. While all
annuities provide a degree of longevity insurance, in recent years
the term has been used to refer to a deferred annuity received at
age 80 or older.28
This insurance is similar to buying car or home insurance
with a large deductible, which optimally deals with catastrophic
risk. By analogy, longevity insurance provides insurance against
outliving one’s assets, but only when that risk becomes substantial
at advanced ages.29
The life cycle theory suggests that rational planners may not
save for a level of consumption at advanced ages that is equivalent
to the level of consumption at earlier ages because of the low
probability of being alive at those advanced ages.30 A longevity

http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Rob Rusconi, National Annuity Markets: Features and Implications,
OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS NO. 24, 8
(Sept. 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/site/iops/documents/48269
620.pdf.
27. Advanced Life Deferred Annuity, ANNUITY DIGEST (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.annuitydigest.com/advanced-life-deferred-annuity/definition.
28. Id.
29. Moshe A. Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible:
Introduction to Advanced-Life Delayed Annuities, INDIVIDUAL FINANCE AND
INSURANCE
DECISIONS
CENTER,
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ifid.ca/pdf_workingpapers/WP2004FEB.pdf.
30. Angus Deaton, Franco Modigliani and the Life Cycle Theory of
Consumption, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, 4 (March 2005), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~deaton/downloads/romelecture.pdf.
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insurance annuity solves that problem by allowing a person, at low
cost, to obtain an annuity that only pays benefits at advanced
ages.31 An advantage of this type of annuity is that a person may
be able to consume more of their non-annuitized resources in their
60s and 70s, knowing that they have longevity insurance that
protects them if they live longer than their life expectancies.
Annuity benefits can be conceptually divided into two
components: old-age benefits and longevity insurance benefits.32
Longevity insurance benefits are a hedge against life expectancy
risk.33 If, hypothetically, a person were certain that he would live
to age 80 but faced an uncertain life expectancy after that, then
benefits paid up to age 80 would be old-age benefits, and benefits
provided after age 80 could be considered longevity insurance
benefits. Alternatively, longevity insurance can be thought of as a
form of insurance against the financial risk of living longer than
one had expected, which could be interpreted for policy purposes
as meaning living longer than one’s life expectancy.34 More
technically, the value of longevity insurance can be determined by
calculating the annuity-equivalent wealth.35 That is the amount of
wealth that would provide the same level of utility as would an
annuity of a fixed value.36
The Social Security benefits paid at age 62 are primarily oldage benefits, and provide little longevity insurance at that age.37
Benefits paid starting at age 82 contain a large component of
longevity insurance for most people.38 As life expectancy at age 62
has increased, the longevity insurance that Social Security
provides has decreased as a percentage of total benefits.39 Thus, a
delayed annuity can be designed to largely serve as longevity
insurance rather than as retirement savings.
A study conducted by researchers at the National Bureau of
Economic Research used a simulation model to show that the
percentage of resources that a person would optimally annuitize
increases over time during retirement.40 For people who have some

31. Anthony Webb et al., An Annuity that People Might Actually Buy,
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE NO. 7-10, 1 (July
2007), available at https://www2.bc.edu/wei-sun/paper/ib_7-10.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. Jason S. Scott et al., Efficient Annuitization: Optimal Strategies for
Hedging Mortality Risk, PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL WORKING PAPER NO.
2007-09
(2007),
available
at
http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org/
publications/document.php?file=305.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Wolfram Horneff et al., Money in Motion: Dynamic Portfolio Choice in
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financial resources invested in equity, they can benefit from equity
premiums early in retirement by gradually reducing their
investment in equity and increasing the amount that is
annuitized.41 A longevity insurance benefit does not follow a
gradual pattern of increasing the share of assets that is
annuitized, but it does capture some of the benefits of that
strategy.42 The authors of that study found that most retirees
would optimally avoid full annuitization until an advanced age,
but by age 80, they would fully annuitize their financial wealth,
with the exception of wealth used for bequests.43 Thus, this
research provides an additional argument in favor of longevity
insurance.
The longevity insurance benefit proposed here is a delayed
annuity paid in the form of a minimum Social Security benefit
starting at age 82. Qualifying persons receiving a Social Security
benefit below a minimum level would have their benefit raised to
the minimum level at that age. This is because a minimum benefit
starting at age 82 is less expensive to provide and is better
targeted than a minimum benefit starting at age 62.
Recognizing this enhanced insurance protection, Social
Security Old-Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) would be renamed
Old-Age, Survivors and Longevity Insurance (OASLI). This
renaming will help to inform people about the benefit. It will
frame the benefit in a positive light, rather than as an anti-poverty
benefit. It will make people aware that longevity insurance
protects retirees against the risk of outliving their resources,
which is a risk associated primarily with advanced older ages.44
B. Life Cycle Planning
In addition to serving as insurance against outliving one’s
resources in advanced old age, longevity insurance can simplify
the related problem that retirees face: that of planning for asset
decumulation.45 Many retirees with moderate income have
difficulty managing the spend-down of their assets over a
retirement period of uncertain length.46 The prevalence of this
problem will swell in the future as an increasing percentage of
retirees have 401(k) plans, which do not provide annuities, rather
than defined benefits plans, which do provide annuities.47
Retirement, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO.
12942, 2 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12942.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2-3.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Kimberly Lankford, Annuities on the Rise in 401(k) Plans,
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With a longevity insurance benefit, the problem of asset
decumulation with uncertain life expectancy is simplified. Instead
of planning for an uncertain period, retirees can plan for the fixed
period from the date of their retirement to the date when they
start receiving the longevity insurance benefit. Technically,
longevity insurance changes their planning problem from one with
a stochastic end point (the date of death) to one with a
deterministic end point (the date at which longevity insurance
begins providing benefits).
As well as assisting in planning, longevity insurance may
help people at advanced ages who have difficulty managing their
finances. At older ages, people are increasingly likely to need
assistance in managing their finances because of declining mental
ability and declining health.48 With longevity insurance, there is
nothing to manage concerning the receipt of the benefits because
the benefits are handled automatically by Social Security,
generally with automatic deposit into their checking accounts.
Thus, they have no checks to cash or investments to manage.
Longevity insurance benefits are also, to some extent, a substitute
for long-term care insurance in that they are payments that
coincide with the period in a person’s life when there is an
increased risk of needing long-term care.
IV. USING LONGEVITY INSURANCE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
The proposed amendment to Social Security of adding
longevity insurance as a benefit would address the problem of
poverty among the old-old by providing guaranteed minimum
benefits to persons age 82 and older. Much of the utility value of
annuitization to workers comes from insuring against the
possibility of running resources down to a very low level if one
lives to be older than expected.49
To help workers use the longevity insurance benefit in
planning their spend-down of resources, an annual benefit
statement would provide information about longevity insurance to
people who would be eligible to receive it in the next five years.

KIPLINGER (June 1, 2012), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T003-C
000-S001-annuities-on-the-rise-in-401-k-plans.html (stating that most workers
do not have the option for annuities with income guarantees in their 401(k)
plans).
48. Hayley Pessin et al., Assessing Psychological Distress Near the End of
Life, AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST VOL. 46 NO. 3, 357 (Nov. 2002),
available
at
http://www.fordham.edu/images/Undergraduate/psychology/
rosenfeld/distress.AmBehSci.pdf.
49. Jeffrey R. Brown, Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory
Annuitization with Mortality Heterogeneity, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMICS
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 9256, 5 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9256.pdf.
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Many of the options that insurance companies have added to
make annuities more attractive reduce the amount of longevity
insurance provided to participants.50 For example, providing a
guarantee of a minimum payment period reduces the value of the
longevity insurance component of the annuity. Thus, a decision
needs to be made, both by individual participants and by public
policy makers, as to the trade-offs between longevity insurance
and other aspects of annuities.
Longevity insurance provides the insurance aspects of
annuitization at the lowest possible cost. It involves a trade-off
between cost and level of benefits early in life. The longevity
insurance provided by benefits received at younger ages is of little
value. Instead, a large percentage of the longevity insurance can
be provided by an annuity that begins payment when the worker
is age 80 or older. Thus, workers can reduce the cost of the annuity
while maintaining most of the longevity insurance by choosing an
annuity that begins payment when they are in their 80s.
One study estimated that, with longevity insurance provided
at an advanced age, a substantial share of the longevity insurance
provided by an immediate annuity can be obtained.51 A deferred
annuity starting at age 85 provides over half the longevity
insurance of an annuity starting at age 65 (between 56 and 62
percent, depending on the degree of risk aversion), and at a
fraction of the cost—roughly 15 percent.52 In fact, a household
planning to smooth consumption through its retirement would
need to allocate only 15 percent of its age 60 wealth to a deferred
annuity with payments starting at age 85.53 The remainder of the
household’s wealth could be held in non-annuitized form to finance
consumption from age 60 to 85.54
The longevity insurance benefit would be a price-indexed
annuity, just like current Social Security benefits. Thus, the
deferred aspect of the annuity would not disadvantage recipients
due to a loss of buying power from the annuity.
Longevity insurance could also become an important
component of a policy to restore Social Security solvency. Public
policy changes likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security
old-age benefits in order to restore the program’s solvency.55

50. John A. Turner & David M. McCarthy, Longevity Insurance Annuities
in 401(k) Plans and IRAs, BENEFITS Q., 59 (2013), available at
http://www.iscebs.org/documents/pdf/bqpublic/bq113f.pdf.
51. Webb et al., supra note 31, at 2.
52. Turner & McCarthy, supra note 50, at 59.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Mark Sarney, Distributional Effects of Increasing the Benefit
Computation Period, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION POLICY BRIEF NO.
2008-02, 3-4 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/
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Indeed, most reform packages that have been proposed cut social
security benefits and therefore raise poverty levels among the
elderly.56 This creates a need to increase the generosity of some
benefits to provide better targeting to vulnerable populations.
That goal could be achieved by providing longevity insurance
benefits. For low-income persons, the effects of benefits cuts later
in life when they are least able to work will be moderated. This
policy shifts Social Security resources toward persons who are both
old and have low incomes. When this policy is enacted within a
fixed budget constraint, without enhanced financing for Social
Security, it involves a transfer of resources from people who are
relatively young (in their early 60s) and well-off to people who are
old and poor.
V. PRIVATE SECTOR ALTERNATIVES
Pension plan tax qualification rules make it difficult for
401(k) participants to purchase longevity insurance.57 The problem
arises with the requirement that minimum distributions from
401(k) plans begin by April 1 of the year following the year the
person turns age 70 and a half.58 This requirement prevents a
person with a small account balance from using the entire balance
to purchase an annuity starting at age 80 or 85. Changes in these
minimum required distribution rules have been proposed by the
Treasury Department to encourage the purchase of longevity
insurance.59 However, it is unlikely that they will be effective in
encouraging such purchases because of the unisex requirement for
provision of annuities from 401(k) plans.60 Males can purchase
longevity insurance annuities at considerably more favorable
terms outside of a 401(k) plan than within one.61
Annuities available through employer-provided retirement
plans in the United States must calculate benefits on a unisex
basis because of a Supreme Court ruling that found the use of

docs/policybriefs/pb2008-02.pdf (proposing two policies that would affect social
security—one extending the 35-year computation period to three years and the
other to four—however, acknowledging that each would result in an increase
in poverty amongst its beneficiaries).
56. Id.
57. See A Guide to Common Qualified Plan Requirements, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (last updated Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/RetirementPlans/A-Guide-to-Common-Qualified-Plan-Requirements (explaining how a
qualified plan must satisfy the Internal Revenue Code in both form and
operation).
58. Id.
59. Steven T. Miller, Longevity Annuity Contracts, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
FED. REGISTER VOL. 77, NO. 23, 5445 (Feb. 12, 2012), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-03/pdf/2012-2340.pdf.
60. Turner & McCarthy, supra note 50, at 58-62.
61. Id.
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gender-based mortality tables in employer-provided pension plans
constituted sex discrimination in compensation.62 In Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris,63 the Supreme Court held that men
and women were required to have the same level of annual
benefits provided to them by the annuities from their employerfunded pension plans if they were the same age and had the same
account balance.64 Thus, employer-sponsored benefits are required
to use the same mortality rates for men and women, despite the
fact that women at typical retirement ages live about three years
longer than men on average.65 Annuities that individuals purchase
with nonpension funds, and annuities purchased through IRAs, do
not have this requirement, and are sold differently depending on
the purchaser’s gender in nearly all states.66 Benefit levels
provided by unisex single-life annuities are favorable to women
but adverse to men, as compared to those provided by genderbased annuities.67
In the annuities provided by 401(k) plans, the disadvantages
to men of purchasing unisex single-life annuities would be offset to
some extent because group annuities offered through employers
are priced lower than single annuities in the private market.68 The
net effect on the cost of annuities within the plan versus outside
the plan is an empirical question. For example, from the federal
government’s life tables the United States for 2007, it can be
calculated that women age 62 are 35 percent more likely than men
of that age to live to age 85.69 At age 85, women’s life expectancy is
17 percent longer than that of men.70 Thus, when priced using
gender-based mortality rates, women’s single-life longevity
insurance annuities purchased at age 62 and beginning payments
at age 85 would cost considerably more than those for men,
perhaps as much as 50 percent more, depending in part on interest
rates.71 For this reason, it is likely that men would be able to
obtain longevity insurance annuities at a substantially lower cost
outside of a 401(k) plan than inside the plan.72

62. Id. at 60.
63. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
64. Id. at 1094.
65. Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2007, NATIONAL VITAL
STATISTICS REPORTS, VOL. 59 NO. 9, 3 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_09.pdf.
66. Turner & McCarthy, supra note 50, at 58-62.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Arias, supra note 65, at 4.
70. Id.
71. Turner & McCarthy, supra note 50, at 60-61.
72. Id.
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With the voluntary choice of annuities, problems of adverse
selection arise, which further increase the disadvantages to men.73
With adverse selection, people with mortality rates above the
group average are less likely to choose annuities than are people
with mortality rates below the group average.74 In the case of
unisex annuities, adverse selection results in women being more
likely to choose single-life annuities offered by 401(k) plans than
men.75 The outcome of voluntary choice and adverse selection is
that the advantage of unisex pricing provided to women is reduced
and the disadvantage to men is increased compared to a situation
where choice of annuities is mandatory.76 This occurs because the
mortality rate assumed by the annuity provider presumably
reflects the fact that men under these circumstances are less likely
to choose annuities than women.77 Thus, the extent to which
adverse selection reduces the advantage of unisex annuities to
women and increases the disadvantage to men is also an empirical
question.
Even ignoring the unisex issue, it is likely that few people
would purchase longevity insurance annuities.78 People are
reluctant to purchase annuities that begin payment immediately.79
They presumably would be even more reluctant to purchase an
annuity that begins payment at age 82. With longevity insurance,
people have better protection against outliving their resources and
ending life in poverty, but the tradeoff is that they have less
money to spend earlier in life.80
VI. BENEFIT PAYMENT STRUCTURES
Longevity insurance benefit payments can be structured in
different ways, at different costs, and with different goals being
served. Benefits can be universal or they can be targeted.
Universal benefits provide longevity insurance without regard for
an individual’s need, while targeted benefits take need into
account.81 Because they are targeted, they can be provided at a
73. Id. at 61.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Andrew L. Gespass, Longevity Insurance: Financial Product for the
FIN.
PLAN.
(2013),
http://www.fpanet.org/journal/
Ages,
J.
BetweentheIssues/LastMonth/Articles/LongevityInsuranceFinancialProductfo
rtheAges/ (examining the likelihood of an individual purchasing longevity
insurance as well as the benefits of doing so).
79. Id.
80. Turner & McCarthy, supra note 50, 59.
81. John A. Turner, Longevity Insurance: Strengthening Social Security at
Advanced Ages, PENSION POLICY CENTER, 11 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/John_Turner_January_2009_Rockefeller_Project.
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lower total cost.82 Within those two categories for benefit
eligibility, benefits can be based on Social Security benefit levels,
years of contributions to Social Security, age, or they can be flat
benefits, set at the same amount for everyone who qualifies.83 For
example, it the benefit is universal, everyone age 82 and older
could receive the same flat amount. Alternatively, everyone age 82
could receive the same amount, but that amount would increase
slightly more than the rate of inflation for subsequent years. If the
benefit is targeted, it could be based on having worked a minimum
number of years, with the amount increasing based on the number
of years actually worked.
While the various options would provide longevity insurance
in different ways, the next section picks a targeted option that
appears to be desirable, and then calculates a rough estimate of its
costs.
VII. TARGET POPULATION
The level of benefits provided by longevity insurance would be
based on quarters of contributions to Social Security. A minimum
of 20 years (80 quarters) of contributions would be required. At
that level, a benefit of 70 percent of the poverty level for a single or
married person, depending on the Social Security benefit received,
would be provided. Under this particular approach, for each
additional four quarters, the benefit would increase by 1.5 percent,
so that someone who had worked 40 years (160 quarters) would
receive a benefit equal to 100 percent of the poverty level. There
would be no maximum number of quarters, so that someone who
worked 45 years would receive a benefit at 107.5 percent of the
poverty level.
Table 1. Relationship between number of years of covered work
and benefit level for the longevity insurance benefit
Number of years (quarters) of Benefit as a percent of the
covered work
poverty level
20 years (80 quarters)
70%
30 years (120 quarters)
85%
40 years (160 quarters)
100%
45 years (180 quarters)
107.5%
Source: Author’s calculations
This benefit formula supports the principle that Social
Security rewards work. It also establishes the principle that a poor
person who has worked for many years and has contributed to
pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Social Security is guaranteed a minimum level of income, and the
dignity associated with that, in advanced old age. The
counterargument to this is that people with low lifetime earnings
tend to have more years of zero earnings, and therefore contribute
less to Social Security, than people with higher lifetime earnings.
For example, people in the lowest quintile of family lifetime
earnings have on average 9.1 years of zero earnings, compared to
2.4 years in the second lowest quintile.84 However, this should not
be enough to deny a poor person at least a poverty-level benefit in
advanced old age.
Divorced people are treated by Social Security as though they
had the advantages of economies of scale in living expenditures
inherent in living with another person.85 They receive the same
benefit as do married people.86 Therefore, longevity insurance
would help divorced people whose former spouses are still living.
The benefit eligibility conditions of Social Security-provided
longevity insurance are designed to exclude people with low
benefits for reasons other than a full career with low earnings.87
First, recipients receiving a low benefit with less than 80 quarters
of covered earnings would be excluded. Second, recipients
receiving benefits from pension plans in non-covered employment
in the federal, state, or local governments would be excluded.
Thus, people would be excluded if they were affected by the
Government Pension Offset, which reduces the spouse’s benefit for
spouses who have a government pension and were not covered by
Social Security, and who were affected by the Windfall
Elimination Provision, which reduces the Social Security benefit
for persons who have a government pension and were not covered
by Social Security.88 The amount of the benefit would vary
depending on the minimum benefit level established and the
benefits already received by persons receiving low Social Security
benefits.
The longevity insurance benefit would improve the
progressivity of Social Security. It would do so by shifting
resources toward a subset of low-income persons. It would also
provide insurance against negative shocks, such as unemployment
late in life or bad health, that cause some people to have low Social
Security benefits.
Additionally, longevity insurance provided automatically to a
broad group of people at a distant point in the future avoids the
problem of adverse selection. When such insurance is purchased

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Sarney, supra note 55, at 3-4.
Turner, supra note 81, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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privately, presumably only people with long life expectancies
purchase it, which drives up its price due to adverse selection.89
While a pure longevity insurance benefit would provide
benefits to everyone reaching the target age, the longevity
insurance benefit proposed here also insures against low benefits
in old age because it is a benefits-tested benefit. However, it does
not consider all of the resources available to older persons, but
rather only their Social Security benefits. The advantage of this
approach is that payment would be automatic, without requiring
the recipient to apply for it. Thus, there would not be a problem
with a low take-up rate among the targeted population. An
estimated 40 percent of the elderly who are eligible for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits do not apply for
them.90 Declining cognitive ability may contribute to a low take-up
rate at advanced older ages.91
Longevity insurance would help make up for the
shortcomings of SSI, and could replace it altogether for the target
age group. Further, it would not be stigmatized like SSI, given
that the benefit would be described as a form of insurance, rather
than as an anti-poverty benefit. It would not be as targeted a
benefit as if all resources were considered as a qualifying
condition, but an administrative process that would take
everything into account would be both expensive and intrusive.
Thus, although targeting is never perfect, it appears that the
benefit would be targeted reasonably well.
VIII. OTHER GROUPS AFFECTED AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES
The children of those people who would be eligible for
longevity insurance would be affected by the implementation of
the benefit because they would have less financial responsibility
for their low-income parents.92 Provision of longevity insurance
may affect family relationships; it may empower the poor elderly
and raise their social standing within their families.
Because this benefit provides a form of insurance, it affects
potential beneficiaries as well as actual beneficiaries because it
provides insurance to a person with low Social Security benefits
even if that person or his or her spouse does not live long enough
to receive the benefit.93 While the probability that a single person
89. Id. at 13.
90. Dalmer D. Hoskins, Tackling Old-Age Poverty in a Contributory
Pension Program, WORLD BANK HITOTSUBASHI WORKSHOP PRESENTATION
(Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/society/
workshop0802/hoskins.pdf.
91. See Pessin et al., supra note 48 (describing the decline in mental
abilities as individuals grow older).
92. Turner, supra note 81, at 14.
93. Id.
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would survive to receive the benefit is roughly 50 percent, the
probability that at least one person in a couple would survive to
receive it is higher.94
In a broader philosophical sense, the insurance would benefit
all Americans. Although an average person at age 50 may not feel
like he or she would ever directly benefit from such insurance, it is
important to remember that that same person could very easily
become less than average. For example, he or she could lose a job
or suffer from serious health problems, in which case, longevity
insurance would benefit him or her greatly later in life.
On the other hand, some may argue that the provision of
longevity insurance, which guarantees minimum benefits, reduces
the incentive to save for people who anticipate that they will
qualify for such benefits. However, because the qualifying
condition is the level of Social Security benefits at age 82, the
likelihood of people deciding not to save in order to qualify would
be minimal. For example, a person could retire at age 62 rather
than at age 65, which would qualify him or her for a higher benefit
at age 82, but this would come at the cost of lower benefits for the
preceding 20 years. Most people will not accept this trade-off.
Thus, it is unlikely that there will be a negative unintended
consequence of people leaving the workforce prematurely.
Additionally, raising the level of Social Security benefits could
mean that some people no longer would be eligible for Food
Stamps, Medicaid, housing allowances and other programs for lowincome persons.95
Another counterargument to the provision of longevity
insurance is that picking the age of 82 would be unfair to African
Americans because of their shorter life expectancy.96 However, as
people grow older, the difference in life expectancies between races
becomes less, and at age 65 the life-expectancy difference between
white women and African American women is less than two
years.97 In fact, at age 65, the difference in life expectancies
between males and females is greater than the difference between
African Americans and whites.98
Another possible consequence of government-provided
longevity insurance would be that such insurance would displace
privately-provided longevity insurance offered by insurance
companies.99 However, this outcome appears unlikely given the
low-purchase of annuities generally, and in particular the low

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 3.
Turner, supra note 81, at 15.
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purchase of annuities by the target population.100 Because this
benefit would be provided universally to the target population,
which is comprised of people with low- to moderate-income, it
would not be affected by adverse selection, which affects the
provision of annuities in voluntary markets.101
In fact, it could be argued that the provision of longevity
insurance by the government for Social Security beneficiaries with
low benefits would encourage the demand among higher-income
retirees for private longevity insurance. The example set by the
government could serve as an endorsement that would encourage
higher-income persons to consider obtaining such insurance
through their 401(k) plans or to purchase it privately.
Because political support tends to be greater for social
insurance than for public assistance, there may be greater political
support for adequate benefits through longevity insurance than
through Supplemental Security Income.
IX. COST ESTIMATE
In 2004, there were 7.3 million persons age 80 and older
receiving Social Security benefits in the United States.102 The
poverty threshold for a single person age 65 and older in 2004 was
$9,060.103 Roughly 24 percent of Social Security beneficiaries age
80 or older had annual benefits less than the poverty threshold,
while roughly 11 percent had annual benefits at less than 70
percent of the poverty threshold104 (based on interpolation, Table
2). Thus, roughly 1.75 million were below the poverty line.105
A 1993 study indicated that, of the retired Social Security
beneficiaries living in poverty, 42 percent had worked between 21
and 40 years and 10 percent had worked for 41 or more years.106
More recent data for benefit recipients in 2004 indicated that less
than 20 percent of recipients had less than 20 years of covered
earnings.107 Thus, if 80 percent of the target population age 82 and
older had at least 20 years of service, that population in 2004
would have been less than 1.4 million. As such, for cost-calculation
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Fisher & DeCesaro, supra note 7, at 21.
103. Poverty Thresholds 2004, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh04.html.
104. Turner, supra note 81, at 15-16.
105. Id.
106. Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Saving Social Security: A
Balanced Plan, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY BRIEF NO. 126, 6 (Dec.
2003),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/papers/2003/12/saving%20orszag/pb126.pdf.
107. W.D. Pfau, How Representative Are Representative Workers? An
Assessment of the Hypothetical Workers Commonly Used in Social Security
Studies, 18 J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 2, 92-117 (2009).
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purposes, we can assume that there would be approximately 1.4
million people eligible for longevity insurance.
The level of the longevity insurance benefit received depends
on the level of the person’s Social Security OASI benefit and the
number of years the person or the person’s spouse (if he or she is
eligible for survivor benefits) worked.108 The data in Table 2
suggest that the average benefits would be less than $3,000 a year.
If these people received a supplemental benefit that averaged
$3,000 a year, the cost would be approximately $4.2 billion a year.
It should be stressed that this figure is rough, but it does indicate
approximate cost. For perspective, the annual cost of this benefit
would be less than half of the monthly cost of the Iraq war.
Table 2. Social Security benefit recipients with low annual
benefits, 2004
Annual Social Percent of
Cumulative
Cumulative
Security
recipients
percent of
percent of
benefit level
recipients
recipients
(dollars)
below the
poverty line
1-999
0.6%
0.6%
2.5%
1,000-1,999
0.6
1.2
5.0
2,000-2,999
0.8
2.0
8.3
3,000-3,999
1.2
3.2
13.3
4,000-4,999
2.3
5.5
22.9
5,000-5,999
3.5
9.0
37.5
6,000-6,999
4.5
13.5
56.25
7,000-7,999
5.6
19.1
80.0
8,000-8,999
4.8
23.9
100.0
9,000-9,999
7.4
31.3
Source: Social Security Administration (2006)109
The choice of a level of benefits involves trade-offs between
budgetary considerations with more generous benefits and social
welfare considerations with less generous benefits. Setting a
benefit at less than the poverty line for workers with less than a
full career of work reflects the thinking that Social Security is not
intended to be the sole source of income for older persons, even
though statistics indicate that it is just that for many older
persons.110 Basing the level of benefits on the current poverty line
recognizes the reality that that is the poverty measure used in the
United States, flawed though it may be. If, in future years, the
United States adopts a new poverty standard, then at that time

108. Turner, supra note 81, at 16.
109. Fisher & DeCesaro, supra note 7, at 21.
110. Turner, supra note 81, at 17.
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policymakers might consider using that standard for setting the
level of the longevity insurance benefit.
An alternative benefit formula for the longevity insurance
benefit would provide benefits that were a percentage increase of
the person’s benefit at age 82, with the increase rising in
accordance with years of covered work.111 There would be a
maximum combined longevity insurance benefit and regular OASI
benefit. For example, the percentage increase could be 20 percent
for workers with 20 years of coverage, increasing by 1.5 percentage
points for every additional year of service. This approach would tie
the longevity insurance benefit more closely to the OASI benefit.
For people with low benefits, it would result in a smaller benefit
increase, and in that sense it would be less well targeted.
As life expectancy at age 65 continues to improve over time,
the qualifying age of 82 will be life expectancy indexed, increasing
with increases in life expectancy. For example, if life expectancy at
age 65 increases by one year, the qualifying age will be raised to
83.112 For each birth cohort, its qualifying age for life expectancy
insurance benefits will be set at age 62, so that retirees will know
what the qualifying age is when they receive their Social Security
benefits.
X. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Longevity insurance annuities, which have only been
available since about 2005, are provided in the U.S. private sector
by a few life insurance companies, namely MetLife, Hartford, and
New York Life Insurance Company.113 If a 65-year-old man in
2008 invested $100,000 with MetLife’s Longevity Income
Guarantee annuity (the maximum benefit without death benefit)
he would receive $83,000 a year starting at age 85.114 Inflation
protection and a return of premium guarantee can increase the
premium by as much as 50 percent.115
The United Kingdom provides a small old age allowance to
persons age 80 and older, called the Old Person’s Pension.116

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. J. Mark Iwry & John A. Turner, Automatic Annuitization: New
Behavioral Strategies for Expanding Lifetime Income in 401(k)s, RETIREMENT
SECURITY PROJECT,
20
(July
2009),
available
at
http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/07%20annuitization%20iw
ry/07_annuitization_iwry.pdf.
114. Kelly Greene, How to Bulletproof Your Nest Egg, WALL ST. J. (June 1,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121259350492445223.html.
115. Id.
116. Social Security Administration, United Kingdom, SOCIAL SECURITY
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, 312 (2012), available at http://www.ssa
.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2012-2013/europe/united_kingdom.pdf.
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Eligibility is based on years of residence in the United Kingdom
and the receipt of a low social security pension, which means less
than 60 percent of the full basic state pension—a pension based on
years of contributions.117 Ireland pays a benefit of about $800 per
year at age 80, called the Age 80 Allowance.118 That benefit is
automatically received by persons receiving Irish social security
pensions once they turn 80.119 Italy has a special supplement for
low-income persons age 75 and older.120 The Riester pensions in
Germany are voluntary defined contribution plans that were
enabled by a 2001 reform, taking effect in 2002.121 They require
that, at retirement, the participant purchase a longevity insurance
annuity that begins payment at age 85.122 Hong Kong provides a
noncontributory old-age benefit that is means-tested at age 65, but
that becomes a flat old-age benefit for all persons at age 70.123 It
has been advocated that longevity insurance annuities play a
major role in individual account private pension systems.124 In
2011, India raised benefits for Social Security participants age 80
and older to help protect them from the effect of price level
increases.125
U.S. Social Security OASI has provided a minimum benefit in
the past, but not a longevity insurance benefit.126 The benefit was
available to workers taking Social Security benefits at the early
retirement age or at any later age.127 Because it was not well
targeted to low-income workers with long careers of covered

117. Id.
118. Department of Social Protection, State Pension, (last updated Jan. 7,
2010), http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/860_State-Pension-Contributory.aspx#
payment.
119. Id.
120. Europa, Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union,
of the European Economic Area and in Switzerland, MUTUAL INFORMATION
SYSTEM ON SOCIAL PROTECTION, 34 (Jan. 1, 2012).
121. Axel H. Börsch-Supan & Christina R. Wilke, Reforming the German
Public Pension System, 8 (Dec. 27, 2005), available at http://www.rand.org/
labor/aging/rsi/rsi_papers/2006_axel1.pdf.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Pensions at a Glance Asia/Pacific 2011, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT,
57
(2012),
available
at
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issuesmigration-health/pensions-at-a-glance-asia-pacific-2011/hongkong_9789264107007-10-en.
124. Pablo Antolin, Policy Options for the Payout Phase, OECD WORKING
PAPER ON INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS NO. 25, 14 (Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/2/41407986.pdf.
125. John Jankowski et al., International Update, Recent Developments in
Foreign Public and Private Pensions, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 2-3
(July 2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/
2011-07/index.html.
126. Turner, supra note 81, at 22.
127. Id.
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employment, it was eliminated for beneficiaries becoming entitled
in 1982 or later.128 A more targeted minimum benefit was created
in 1972 and still exists, but it is being phased out.129 There have
been proposals for a new minimum benefit that would require at
least 20 years of covered work and would increase in value for each
additional year of covered work, reaching 100 percent of the
poverty threshold for workers with 35 years of covered work.130
XI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Providing a higher guaranteed minimum benefit or providing
it to more people would increase the cost of longevity insurance.131
Lowering the age limit would likewise raise the cost.132
Conversely, requiring more than 80 quarters of covered work,
which would limit the benefit to people with longer work histories
and their survivors, would lower the cost.133 Having an earnings
test or asset test, rather than having the only qualification test be
whether the individual receives Social Security benefits, would
lower the cost in benefits paid but raise the administrative cost.134
Indexing the age limit for increases in life expectancy would lower
the cost of the benefit.135 Setting a maximum amount by which the
longevity insurance benefit could increase the OASI benefit would
reduce the cost.136 For example, the maximum longevity insurance
benefit could be set at $5,000 a year.137
Integration with Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is one
issue facing the implementation of longevity insurance. If SSI was
the first payer, the longevity insurance benefit would be based on
the total of the person’s Social Security benefit and SSI benefit,
which would lower the cost to Social Security and shift part of the
cost onto general revenue funds.138 A similar issue arises for
Veteran’s pensions, which are pensions for low-income veterans.139
XII. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A result similar to the provision of longevity insurance could
be reached through the utilization of Supplemental Security

128. Id.
129. Diamond & Orszag, supra note 106, at 101.
130. See id. at 102-03 (proposing a benefit enhancement that would result in
an almost 12 percent benefit increase).
131. Turner, supra note 81, at 23.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Income, specifically by raising the level of benefits it provides for
persons age 82 and older.140 However, the longevity insurance
approach would be simpler to administer and would not be
stigmatized like SSI. The benefit would be viewed as a form of
insurance rather than as a government dole.141
Survivors’ benefits could also be raised to achieve a similar
result, but those would be less targeted and thus more
expensive.142 Longevity insurance would be better targeted to
people with long service in the workforce who received low Social
Security benefits and who had reached an advanced age.143
Furthermore, minimum benefits could be raised with the
same qualifying conditions, except for age, with the benefits being
available earlier, such as at age 62. Yet, it would be better to
target longevity by age. As life expectancy continues to increase,
age 62 becomes a relatively younger age, compared to expected age
at death.144 Additionally, providing minimum benefits at an earlier
age would be more likely to have adverse incentive effects for older
workers to remain in the workforce.145 While people in their 60s
and even in their 70s may be able to continue working, people in
their eighties likely cannot.146
A concern that might be raised is that this policy would lead
to an eventual expansion of the minimum benefit to younger age
groups. In fact, with this proposal, the age limit would be raised
over time in line with increases in life expectancy at age 65 to
preserve its role as longevity insurance. Lowering the age limit
would move the benefit toward being an old-age benefit rather
than longevity insurance. For example, lowering the age limit by
providing a minimum benefit at age 62 would have adverse
incentive effects on the labor supply and savings of older lowincome workers.147
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
People with low Social Security benefits who are in their 80s
are a particularly vulnerable group. At that age, few are able to
compensate for their low benefits by working. As a matter of
national policy, it is desirable that people in this age group, often
called the old-old, are able to live with sufficient resources so that
they are able to enjoy the last years of their lives with dignity.
The target population for the proposal discussed here is
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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people age 82 and older with low Social Security benefits and long
work histories. Age 82 is chosen as approximately the average life
expectancy at age 65. Elderly poverty is particularly high among
this age group—a third higher than for people age 65 to 69. People
in this age group are particularly at risk of falling into poverty
even though they had not been in poverty earlier in their lives.
They also have greater difficulty leaving poverty than younger
retirees.
A minimum benefit starting at age 82 is less expensive to
provide, and is better targeted, than a minimum benefit starting
at age 62. Longevity insurance benefits are also, to some extent, a
substitute for long-term care insurance in that they are payments
that coincide with the period of an increased risk of needing longterm care. Longevity insurance would help make up for the
shortcomings of SSI, and could replace it for the target age group.
Further, it would not be stigmatized, given that the benefit would
be described as a form of insurance, rather than as an anti-poverty
benefit.
Longevity insurance can be an important component of a
policy package to restore Social Security solvency. Public policy
changes likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security old-age
benefits to restore solvency. If general benefit reductions, such as
through longevity indexing of benefits as of retirement age, are
combined with a new longevity insurance benefit, it may be
possible to retain much of the longevity insurance Social Security
provides for low-income persons. For these individuals, the effects
of benefit cuts later in life when they are least able to work will be
moderated. This policy shifts Social Security resources toward
persons who are both old and have low incomes. It involves a
transfer of resources from people who are young and well-off to
people who are old and poorly off.
Longevity insurance would be particularly desirable if a
benefit cut disproportionately affected people at older ages. It
would be particularly valuable, for example, if the cost-of-living
adjustment is changed, such as by using the chained Consumer
Price Index (CPI), so that the indexing is reduced. That change
would disproportionately affect people at older ages because the
effect would be compounded as they grew older.

Do Not Delete

866

10/18/2013 4:31 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:841

